Good question! Me-two-years-ago apparently decided that writing about veto procedure just wasn't important to the piece, which leaves me, two years later, trying to excavate what I thought (and assess anew whether my thoughts back then were good)!
Since the text of this amendment doesn't alter veto procedure at all, I think the only way to interpret this is that a vetoed money bill would follow standard veto procedure: it would be returned to both houses for an override vote -- with no deadline. I did do another amendment modifying the veto, but it wouldn't affect this situation at all. So if the House prevents the Senate from bottling up a money bill using this amendment, the President's subsequent veto would allow the Senate to bottle it up again -- this time, forever.
Is that good or bad? I'm not sure how carefully I thought about this in 2021, but, two years later, I'm inclined to say that it's good... or at least prudent. I have a lot of concerns about presidential power, especially the power of the veto. The veto turns the President from the implementer of Congress's will into far and away the most important shaper and manipulator of Congress's will. (My veto-related amendment was called "Geld the Veto.") Still, if the House passes a money bill by simple majority (perhaps a bare majority), but the Senate opposes it enough to filibuster it for a year, *and* the President opposes it enough to veto it, then that money bill probably doesn't have the kind of broad-spectrum support that bills ought to have to become law, and therefore should not have a glide path through the Senate once vetoed. The House should have more trump cards, but not all the trump cards.
I'm not 100% on this, though. I could see an argument for adding a section to this amendment requiring the Senate to take an up-or-down vote on a veto within, say, a month, but I'm torn about whether that gives the House too much power or exactly the right amount of power. Maybe that's why I avoided writing about it at the time!
Good question! Me-two-years-ago apparently decided that writing about veto procedure just wasn't important to the piece, which leaves me, two years later, trying to excavate what I thought (and assess anew whether my thoughts back then were good)!
Since the text of this amendment doesn't alter veto procedure at all, I think the only way to interpret this is that a vetoed money bill would follow standard veto procedure: it would be returned to both houses for an override vote -- with no deadline. I did do another amendment modifying the veto, but it wouldn't affect this situation at all. So if the House prevents the Senate from bottling up a money bill using this amendment, the President's subsequent veto would allow the Senate to bottle it up again -- this time, forever.
Is that good or bad? I'm not sure how carefully I thought about this in 2021, but, two years later, I'm inclined to say that it's good... or at least prudent. I have a lot of concerns about presidential power, especially the power of the veto. The veto turns the President from the implementer of Congress's will into far and away the most important shaper and manipulator of Congress's will. (My veto-related amendment was called "Geld the Veto.") Still, if the House passes a money bill by simple majority (perhaps a bare majority), but the Senate opposes it enough to filibuster it for a year, *and* the President opposes it enough to veto it, then that money bill probably doesn't have the kind of broad-spectrum support that bills ought to have to become law, and therefore should not have a glide path through the Senate once vetoed. The House should have more trump cards, but not all the trump cards.
I'm not 100% on this, though. I could see an argument for adding a section to this amendment requiring the Senate to take an up-or-down vote on a veto within, say, a month, but I'm torn about whether that gives the House too much power or exactly the right amount of power. Maybe that's why I avoided writing about it at the time!