This might be a another proposed amendment article from you in the future, but I was curious what you would think of a line-item veto for appropriations. With and without gelding the presidential veto. Also be interesting to see what would be the inter-branch dynamics of having a line-item veto as well as the House having a strong power of the purse as you also propose. More of a move to a quasi-parliamentary structure?
If the veto is gelded, then I think a line-item veto could be a salutary measure. Sending it on back to the legislature to make them REALLY think it through could be good for them.
If the veto is NOT gelded, though, then (with apologies to Newt Gingrich and the Contract for America) I think a line-item veto would be a catastrophe. In a system where an executive veto can only be surmounted by a legislative supermajority, a line-item veto is nothing but a vast transfer of legislative power to the executive. As long as his opposition doesn't hold a supermajority (a *bicameral* supermajority, at that!), the executive now can exercise legislative power not only by using the threat of a general veto as leverage against negotiators; now he can literally *rewrite the bill* using his targeted veto. All the ugly tendencies in our system that transform the executive into a legislator-in-chief are amplified tenfold under a line-item veto.
This isn't a weird side effect, either; it is, explicitly, the *justification* for having a line-item veto. President Clinton asked Congress to give it to him so he could "take the heat" for cutting pork-barrel spending measures that Congress apparently just couldn't help stuffing into bills. Congress itself had such a low opinion of itself that it *agreed* it was incapable of legislating and delegated this core legislative power to the executive branch. I have to imagine that the king-fearing Founding Fathers would have despaired at the sight.
This is before we even get into all the stupid antics a line-item veto enables, like Gov. Tony Evers in Wisconsin using the veto to strike the hyphen and the digits "20" from the phrase "...until the 2024-25 school year" in order to turn a one-year appropriation into a four-century appropriation. ("...until the 2425 school year.")
Sorry to come on so strong! I really hate line-item vetoes because of how they humiliate the legislature, which ought to be first among equals. However, like I said, if the veto were gelded, a line-item suspensory veto (overridden by simple majority) might be a very good trade-off -- certainly one I'd be willing to make in exchange for the overall gelding -- and could be genuinely useful by letting the President raise a red flag without actually exercising legislative leverage.
(Most states have already given their governors this power, at least to some extent. I would undo that, too, if I had a magic wand.)
This might be a another proposed amendment article from you in the future, but I was curious what you would think of a line-item veto for appropriations. With and without gelding the presidential veto. Also be interesting to see what would be the inter-branch dynamics of having a line-item veto as well as the House having a strong power of the purse as you also propose. More of a move to a quasi-parliamentary structure?
If the veto is gelded, then I think a line-item veto could be a salutary measure. Sending it on back to the legislature to make them REALLY think it through could be good for them.
If the veto is NOT gelded, though, then (with apologies to Newt Gingrich and the Contract for America) I think a line-item veto would be a catastrophe. In a system where an executive veto can only be surmounted by a legislative supermajority, a line-item veto is nothing but a vast transfer of legislative power to the executive. As long as his opposition doesn't hold a supermajority (a *bicameral* supermajority, at that!), the executive now can exercise legislative power not only by using the threat of a general veto as leverage against negotiators; now he can literally *rewrite the bill* using his targeted veto. All the ugly tendencies in our system that transform the executive into a legislator-in-chief are amplified tenfold under a line-item veto.
This isn't a weird side effect, either; it is, explicitly, the *justification* for having a line-item veto. President Clinton asked Congress to give it to him so he could "take the heat" for cutting pork-barrel spending measures that Congress apparently just couldn't help stuffing into bills. Congress itself had such a low opinion of itself that it *agreed* it was incapable of legislating and delegated this core legislative power to the executive branch. I have to imagine that the king-fearing Founding Fathers would have despaired at the sight.
This is before we even get into all the stupid antics a line-item veto enables, like Gov. Tony Evers in Wisconsin using the veto to strike the hyphen and the digits "20" from the phrase "...until the 2024-25 school year" in order to turn a one-year appropriation into a four-century appropriation. ("...until the 2425 school year.")
Sorry to come on so strong! I really hate line-item vetoes because of how they humiliate the legislature, which ought to be first among equals. However, like I said, if the veto were gelded, a line-item suspensory veto (overridden by simple majority) might be a very good trade-off -- certainly one I'd be willing to make in exchange for the overall gelding -- and could be genuinely useful by letting the President raise a red flag without actually exercising legislative leverage.
(Most states have already given their governors this power, at least to some extent. I would undo that, too, if I had a magic wand.)