This whole thing is an utter embarrassment to watch. It’s like watching two five year olds playing a taxpayer-subsidized game of chicken when they’re supposed to be cleaning their rooms, except there are no parents around to punish both of them. I don‘t care which caucus is more at fault, this all needs to end, now!
This is the kind of stuff that absolutely sickens me about politics, and one of the main reasons why I’ll never run for public office, even though I find the law and public policy stuff fascinating.
But, then again, I’m not on either side of this mess, so that probably shapes my perspective. I’ve Laetae sentiae excommunicated myself from both Team Red and Team Blue 😛
I would suggest that the root of this problem stems from the high quorum requirement in the Minnesota Legislature (which is not unique to Minnesota, of course; every state legislature in the United States has a high requirement, as do France and Germany at least).
Let us suppose that Minnesota had only a one-third quorum requirement. Then there would be no question that the GOP members alone would constitute a quorum (being 67 members with, at most, 45 being necessary for a quorum), the House would organise itself, elect a Speaker, and proceed with the ordinary business of the House. The DFL members would not like this, of course, but there would be nothing they could do about it (and they dug themselves the hole when they didn't properly vet their candidates to ensure that they were actually qualified to represent the districts in which they were running). The crisis would not only be averted but would never have arisen in the first place, and there would be no incentive for the DFL members to avoid meetings of the legislature.
This isn't even something that would be foreign to the United States, either. Massachusetts's original Constitution provided for a very large lower house (I believe it reached nearly 750 members at one point, and even after Maine became its own state it still reached a size well over 600) and quorum was, if memory serves, only 100 members (maybe only 60 at first; I would have to go back and check). This was, however, later amended to a majority requirement. So there is precedent not just in legislative procedure generally but even when only considering such procedure in the United States to have a quorum well below a majority, and arguably it can enhance the legitimacy of government by removing any incentive for disgruntled members to boycott a legislature. (See recent past rows in Oregon and Texas, which have two-thirds quorum requirements, where members of the minority refused to attend to attempt to prevent the passage of legislation with which they disagreed by preventing the legislature from functioning at all due to the lack of a quorum.)
This comes up so rarely that it feels like almost a silly thing to amend the constitution over, so much work for so little payoff... but then it DOES come up and all of a sudden you're, like, "Man, we really need to amend the constitution to fix this."
Unfortunately, I suspect that the moment it comes up is precisely the moment when it's politically impossible to amend it, because the party taking advantage of the quorum requirement will not only defend the quorum during the confrontation, but continue to defend it for 5-10 years afterward. By the time the issue has fully depolarized again, nobody cares, and it is therefore difficult to amend again.
I suspect this is true of several procedural constitutional provisions, like the electoral college (which Republicans are now *far* more likely to defend since they have, by fluke, won two of the last seven presidential elections with it).
As you've said, though... at least we don't have one of those crazy two-thirds requirements! Maybe I'll need to content myself with that.
That's probably the issue. It's not just that it's a minor procedural provision that rarely comes up (if that's all it were, you could at least build a consensus to change it, like the 20th and 25th Amendments federally), it's that when it does come up, it's to the great political advantage of one faction. (I would find it very funny if in 2026 the Minnesota House remained at 67-67 as initially elected but this time an elected GOP candidate turns out to be ineligible to represent a district, so the GOP boycotts the House to prevent the DFL from doing anything. Coming from a country where quorum-busting is unheard-of* due to pointlessness I think any party that tries it should be hoist by their own petard sooner or later. And who knows, maybe that would get everyone to agree that this is stupid and the requirement should be lowered. Scrolling through the list of state legislatures, the only places where it might even have a chance of happening are Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and the circumstances would be incredibly unlikely. The states that have two-thirds requirements have legislatures that are likely too partisan in one direction or the other for such a flip to be plausible.)
*That said, parliamentary confidence systems do have their own form of it. A common tactic, especially in majority parliaments, is for opposition parties to move hundreds of amendments to the government's budget, each of which has to be defeated or it will be a signal of a loss of confidence by the House in the government. (Of course, the government could accept some of them, in which case it would not be a loss of confidence for those to pass.) The Speaker will generally combine some of the motions due to similarity and rule others out of order, but that will still leave a lot of votes to be held, and the government whips have to ensure that they always have enough members in the chamber so that they can outvote whichever opposition members happen to be there. It's not quite the same as quorum-busting but it is a way of forcing the government caucus to keep its members on the floor. (It's more similar to a quorum call, I guess, which is another tactic that gets used in majority-quorum-requirement legislatures. I know Elizabeth Warren, at least when the Democratic Party has been in the minority, has sometimes ended her speeches on the Senate floor with "and I suggest the absence of a quorum" to force Republican leadership to get 51 Senators to the floor so that business can resume. Possibly others routinely do this as well; I just haven't seen any clips of it other than from Sen. Warren.)
Conceivably, we might not even have to wait until 2026! One death or resignation in the GOP caucus in around late April would put the proverbial shoe on the other foot. Then the GOP might skip town to prevent the sudden DFL trifecta from moving legislation by itself. (This is unlikely, and still very gross, but would be karmic!)
One time when it occurs to me that it might have been the time to alter the quorum requirement was when COVID first hit and there was a focus on keeping appropriate physical distance between people to slow transmission. Unfortunately, if you have a majority-quorum legislative body and a chamber that isn't big enough for everyone to have a suitable amount of space around them, this is a problem when it comes to keeping the legislature functioning while also avoiding disease transmission.
The answer up here, when it was clear that the federal Parliament would need to pass substantial relief programs in a hurry (wage subsidies, employment insurance enhancements, etc), was that the various parties in Parliament arranged among themselves to send only just enough members to meet a quorum (30 in the federal House, 15 in the federal Senate*) in rough proportion to the number of seats each party held. (Opposition parties were also made privy to the details of the government's spending proposals prior to first reading, which is ordinarily not done.) But this was only doable because of the low quorum requirement, an option not available to majority-quorum legislatures.
The government could, of course, possibly have attempted simply to have thirty of its own MPs in the House chamber to pass legislation with effectively no debate, but that would have invited other chicanery from the opposition parties looking to abuse the low quorum requirement to move a surprise no-confidence motion or something like that. Thus it was in everyone's interest to keep the various parties fairly represented.
*Eventually the House started meeting virtually, which led to its own amusing moments (like the Speaker having to remind an MP that their microphone was muted, or most MPs not having a good backdrop for their home broadcast location), but the Senate never did as I recall, which led to problems because it had effectively become a rubber-stamp with only Senators from Ontario and Quebec and none from elsewhere in the country due to travel constraints.
Since it probably doesn't warrant a full Some Constitutional Amendments article, let this comment serve as a suggestion instead. (Also recommended for every state constitution.)
Quorum
(1) A quorum for doing business shall consist of one-third of all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.
(2) Each House shall meet at a place to be ascertained by law; provided, that said place shall, upon enactment of this amendment, be the place where each House meets as of the enactment of this amendment.
(3) The place where each House meets cannot be changed except by a vote in the affirmative of an absolute two-thirds majority of all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House on a concurrent resolution of both Houses to move such place.
(4) The executive authority shall have no veto of any resolution made under section (3), and shall have no authority to convene any session, regular or special, of the legislature in any place other than that which has been ascertained by law pursuant to sections (2) and (3).
(5) No member shall be expelled from either House without a vote in the affirmative for such expulsion by an absolute two-thirds majority of all members to which that House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House.
(6) The legislature shall have power to enforce and implement the provisions of this amendment.
Brief explanations in plainer language:
(1) This is the main point of the amendment, changing the quorum requirement to remove quorum-busting and retaining existing power to compel everyone to attend. (It's possible an especially fractured legislature could end up with nobody willing to show up if it means that another bloc is there with them to make quorum.)
(2) This continues whatever is currently in force so that there's no question of where the legislature will meet next.
(3) Now we get into the meat of this amendment. To avoid a minimal quorum of leiglsators from adjourning to some other place where, possibly, their ideological opponents can't get to easily (less a concern with modern communication and travel infrastructure, but might as well play it safe), moving the meeting place of the legislature requires two-thirds of all possible members (counting all vacancies) to agree to the move.
(4) "Concurrent resolution" is currently, as I understand it, a legal term of art to mean a motion that has to be agreed to by both Houses of a bicameral legislature but not by the executive. However, just for extra certainty, to avoid arguments between different schools of legal interpretation, we might as well say explicitly that the executive can't veto it. We'll also say that the executive can't try to call a special session to meet somewhere else, again for greater certainty.
(5) This is an anti-chicanery provision. It's probably not necessary given how the other requirements are worded to count all the vacant seats, but just in case I forgot something, let's make sure that members can't be expelled with a lower threshold in some sort of bid to lower the threshold for those requirements by some other means. (Expelling members and then reducing the size of the legislature came to mind as I wrote this, which is why I have the convoluted "all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House" wording.) It should also be noted that at least at the federal level, the three post-Civil War expulsions, of Michael Myers, James Traficant and George Santos, all met this threshold with over 290 members voting to expel.
(6) This is just a catch-all provision. It's probably not necessary, but just to be sure, let's say the legislature can make laws about anything in here that needs making laws about.
Also, of course, "executive authority" would have to be changed to "President" or "Governor" (or whatever other term is appropriate). And if you're in Nebraska, you'll have to change this to account for a unicameral legislature.
But as you said, James, this is one of those things that doesn't seem necessary right up until it very clearly is, but it's only ever clear that it is when it's just been used to the political advantage of one ideological faction and they are therefore inclined to resist such a change.
Maybe not a full article, but might make a nice bonus feature! The only thing that bugs me about it is how long it is, because the American Constitution has a particular stylistic flair for concision, but the problem is that you're dealing with B.S. and the only way to respond to B.S. with real confidence is to whack it down pre-emptively with, well, lots of provisions spelling out everything in detail.
Does the "move the place of meeting" clause need to have a supermajority requirement? I agree it can't just be the majority of a quorum with such a small quorum, but absolute majority seems like it wouldn't be (particularly) open to abuse, and two-thirds might be confining in a nuclear war or other mass-casualties scenario. (Come to think of it, absolute majority might also be tricky under those circumstances, but that's a problem the Constitution has already, so we don't need to solve it.)
The length is an issue, but it's not like the US Constitution doesn't already have some pretty long amendments (and you can go look at state constitutions for even more); just consider the 12th, 14th, 20th and 25th amendments.
The supermajority requirement on moving the place of meeting is just there to prevent a thin majority from moving it to some inconvenient location. Getting there might not be too much of an issue with modern travel, but there are other concerns that could arise. If civil order breaks down enough, it's not unthinkable that some legislators could literally fear for their lives in some parts of the country. (Already Gabrielle Giffords and Steve Scalise both come to mind; Thomas D'Arcy McGee is an example from further back.)
A mass-casualties event is going to pose lots of challenges to democratic governance anyway, possibly to the point of the executive (whoever that ends up being) having to rule by decree (YMMV on whether this would be more than they already do) until elections can be organised. The requirement probably doesn't matter in that scenario; if, let's say, the Twin Cities are taken out in a nuclear strike but enough legislators survive to still form a two-thirds majority, and Minnesota has adopted this amendment, I suspect that there would be very little stink raised if they met at the edge of the fallout zone, voted unanimously to meet in Duluth going forward, and then went there posthaste. ("Your Honour, we got as close to the designated meeting place as possible without risking unsafe radiation exposure; 'the law was made for man, not man for the law'.") It's nice to be able to plan for black-swan events, but not at the expense of permitting untoward shenanigans under more normal circumstances. But maybe there's something I'm missing.
One thing that does possibly come to mind is that "then most recent election" should be "then most recent general election" to avoid someone trying to claim that special elections count (one more hoop to jump through with expulsion, reducing the size of the body, then have someone resign and hold a special election, this is getting complicated but as you say, dealing with BS means whacking it all down preemptively).
Big fan of the new article for updates like this model. On really-live items I’ll often naturally still have the comments thread up and refresh for a few days anyway so I’ll see longer edits but there’s not much that rivals the dopamine hit of a fresh De Civ email!
This whole thing is an utter embarrassment to watch. It’s like watching two five year olds playing a taxpayer-subsidized game of chicken when they’re supposed to be cleaning their rooms, except there are no parents around to punish both of them. I don‘t care which caucus is more at fault, this all needs to end, now!
This is the kind of stuff that absolutely sickens me about politics, and one of the main reasons why I’ll never run for public office, even though I find the law and public policy stuff fascinating.
But, then again, I’m not on either side of this mess, so that probably shapes my perspective. I’ve Laetae sentiae excommunicated myself from both Team Red and Team Blue 😛
I would suggest that the root of this problem stems from the high quorum requirement in the Minnesota Legislature (which is not unique to Minnesota, of course; every state legislature in the United States has a high requirement, as do France and Germany at least).
But consider what would happen if the quorum requirement were lower. My own province, for instance, requires only 10 members for a quorum in its legislature, which has 93 members: https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96066_01 (sec. 42). (Originally this was 9 members of 25: see https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/hstats/hstats/1799836107 in section 23 and I do not know when this requirement was changed from nine to ten.) Australia requires one-third; India one-tenth. (I could add more examples.)
Let us suppose that Minnesota had only a one-third quorum requirement. Then there would be no question that the GOP members alone would constitute a quorum (being 67 members with, at most, 45 being necessary for a quorum), the House would organise itself, elect a Speaker, and proceed with the ordinary business of the House. The DFL members would not like this, of course, but there would be nothing they could do about it (and they dug themselves the hole when they didn't properly vet their candidates to ensure that they were actually qualified to represent the districts in which they were running). The crisis would not only be averted but would never have arisen in the first place, and there would be no incentive for the DFL members to avoid meetings of the legislature.
This isn't even something that would be foreign to the United States, either. Massachusetts's original Constitution provided for a very large lower house (I believe it reached nearly 750 members at one point, and even after Maine became its own state it still reached a size well over 600) and quorum was, if memory serves, only 100 members (maybe only 60 at first; I would have to go back and check). This was, however, later amended to a majority requirement. So there is precedent not just in legislative procedure generally but even when only considering such procedure in the United States to have a quorum well below a majority, and arguably it can enhance the legitimacy of government by removing any incentive for disgruntled members to boycott a legislature. (See recent past rows in Oregon and Texas, which have two-thirds quorum requirements, where members of the minority refused to attend to attempt to prevent the passage of legislation with which they disagreed by preventing the legislature from functioning at all due to the lack of a quorum.)
This comes up so rarely that it feels like almost a silly thing to amend the constitution over, so much work for so little payoff... but then it DOES come up and all of a sudden you're, like, "Man, we really need to amend the constitution to fix this."
Unfortunately, I suspect that the moment it comes up is precisely the moment when it's politically impossible to amend it, because the party taking advantage of the quorum requirement will not only defend the quorum during the confrontation, but continue to defend it for 5-10 years afterward. By the time the issue has fully depolarized again, nobody cares, and it is therefore difficult to amend again.
I suspect this is true of several procedural constitutional provisions, like the electoral college (which Republicans are now *far* more likely to defend since they have, by fluke, won two of the last seven presidential elections with it).
As you've said, though... at least we don't have one of those crazy two-thirds requirements! Maybe I'll need to content myself with that.
That's probably the issue. It's not just that it's a minor procedural provision that rarely comes up (if that's all it were, you could at least build a consensus to change it, like the 20th and 25th Amendments federally), it's that when it does come up, it's to the great political advantage of one faction. (I would find it very funny if in 2026 the Minnesota House remained at 67-67 as initially elected but this time an elected GOP candidate turns out to be ineligible to represent a district, so the GOP boycotts the House to prevent the DFL from doing anything. Coming from a country where quorum-busting is unheard-of* due to pointlessness I think any party that tries it should be hoist by their own petard sooner or later. And who knows, maybe that would get everyone to agree that this is stupid and the requirement should be lowered. Scrolling through the list of state legislatures, the only places where it might even have a chance of happening are Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and the circumstances would be incredibly unlikely. The states that have two-thirds requirements have legislatures that are likely too partisan in one direction or the other for such a flip to be plausible.)
*That said, parliamentary confidence systems do have their own form of it. A common tactic, especially in majority parliaments, is for opposition parties to move hundreds of amendments to the government's budget, each of which has to be defeated or it will be a signal of a loss of confidence by the House in the government. (Of course, the government could accept some of them, in which case it would not be a loss of confidence for those to pass.) The Speaker will generally combine some of the motions due to similarity and rule others out of order, but that will still leave a lot of votes to be held, and the government whips have to ensure that they always have enough members in the chamber so that they can outvote whichever opposition members happen to be there. It's not quite the same as quorum-busting but it is a way of forcing the government caucus to keep its members on the floor. (It's more similar to a quorum call, I guess, which is another tactic that gets used in majority-quorum-requirement legislatures. I know Elizabeth Warren, at least when the Democratic Party has been in the minority, has sometimes ended her speeches on the Senate floor with "and I suggest the absence of a quorum" to force Republican leadership to get 51 Senators to the floor so that business can resume. Possibly others routinely do this as well; I just haven't seen any clips of it other than from Sen. Warren.)
Conceivably, we might not even have to wait until 2026! One death or resignation in the GOP caucus in around late April would put the proverbial shoe on the other foot. Then the GOP might skip town to prevent the sudden DFL trifecta from moving legislation by itself. (This is unlikely, and still very gross, but would be karmic!)
One time when it occurs to me that it might have been the time to alter the quorum requirement was when COVID first hit and there was a focus on keeping appropriate physical distance between people to slow transmission. Unfortunately, if you have a majority-quorum legislative body and a chamber that isn't big enough for everyone to have a suitable amount of space around them, this is a problem when it comes to keeping the legislature functioning while also avoiding disease transmission.
The answer up here, when it was clear that the federal Parliament would need to pass substantial relief programs in a hurry (wage subsidies, employment insurance enhancements, etc), was that the various parties in Parliament arranged among themselves to send only just enough members to meet a quorum (30 in the federal House, 15 in the federal Senate*) in rough proportion to the number of seats each party held. (Opposition parties were also made privy to the details of the government's spending proposals prior to first reading, which is ordinarily not done.) But this was only doable because of the low quorum requirement, an option not available to majority-quorum legislatures.
The government could, of course, possibly have attempted simply to have thirty of its own MPs in the House chamber to pass legislation with effectively no debate, but that would have invited other chicanery from the opposition parties looking to abuse the low quorum requirement to move a surprise no-confidence motion or something like that. Thus it was in everyone's interest to keep the various parties fairly represented.
*Eventually the House started meeting virtually, which led to its own amusing moments (like the Speaker having to remind an MP that their microphone was muted, or most MPs not having a good backdrop for their home broadcast location), but the Senate never did as I recall, which led to problems because it had effectively become a rubber-stamp with only Senators from Ontario and Quebec and none from elsewhere in the country due to travel constraints.
Since it probably doesn't warrant a full Some Constitutional Amendments article, let this comment serve as a suggestion instead. (Also recommended for every state constitution.)
Quorum
(1) A quorum for doing business shall consist of one-third of all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.
(2) Each House shall meet at a place to be ascertained by law; provided, that said place shall, upon enactment of this amendment, be the place where each House meets as of the enactment of this amendment.
(3) The place where each House meets cannot be changed except by a vote in the affirmative of an absolute two-thirds majority of all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House on a concurrent resolution of both Houses to move such place.
(4) The executive authority shall have no veto of any resolution made under section (3), and shall have no authority to convene any session, regular or special, of the legislature in any place other than that which has been ascertained by law pursuant to sections (2) and (3).
(5) No member shall be expelled from either House without a vote in the affirmative for such expulsion by an absolute two-thirds majority of all members to which that House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House.
(6) The legislature shall have power to enforce and implement the provisions of this amendment.
Brief explanations in plainer language:
(1) This is the main point of the amendment, changing the quorum requirement to remove quorum-busting and retaining existing power to compel everyone to attend. (It's possible an especially fractured legislature could end up with nobody willing to show up if it means that another bloc is there with them to make quorum.)
(2) This continues whatever is currently in force so that there's no question of where the legislature will meet next.
(3) Now we get into the meat of this amendment. To avoid a minimal quorum of leiglsators from adjourning to some other place where, possibly, their ideological opponents can't get to easily (less a concern with modern communication and travel infrastructure, but might as well play it safe), moving the meeting place of the legislature requires two-thirds of all possible members (counting all vacancies) to agree to the move.
(4) "Concurrent resolution" is currently, as I understand it, a legal term of art to mean a motion that has to be agreed to by both Houses of a bicameral legislature but not by the executive. However, just for extra certainty, to avoid arguments between different schools of legal interpretation, we might as well say explicitly that the executive can't veto it. We'll also say that the executive can't try to call a special session to meet somewhere else, again for greater certainty.
(5) This is an anti-chicanery provision. It's probably not necessary given how the other requirements are worded to count all the vacant seats, but just in case I forgot something, let's make sure that members can't be expelled with a lower threshold in some sort of bid to lower the threshold for those requirements by some other means. (Expelling members and then reducing the size of the legislature came to mind as I wrote this, which is why I have the convoluted "all members to which each House was entitled as of the then most recent election of members to that House" wording.) It should also be noted that at least at the federal level, the three post-Civil War expulsions, of Michael Myers, James Traficant and George Santos, all met this threshold with over 290 members voting to expel.
(6) This is just a catch-all provision. It's probably not necessary, but just to be sure, let's say the legislature can make laws about anything in here that needs making laws about.
Also, of course, "executive authority" would have to be changed to "President" or "Governor" (or whatever other term is appropriate). And if you're in Nebraska, you'll have to change this to account for a unicameral legislature.
But as you said, James, this is one of those things that doesn't seem necessary right up until it very clearly is, but it's only ever clear that it is when it's just been used to the political advantage of one ideological faction and they are therefore inclined to resist such a change.
Maybe not a full article, but might make a nice bonus feature! The only thing that bugs me about it is how long it is, because the American Constitution has a particular stylistic flair for concision, but the problem is that you're dealing with B.S. and the only way to respond to B.S. with real confidence is to whack it down pre-emptively with, well, lots of provisions spelling out everything in detail.
Does the "move the place of meeting" clause need to have a supermajority requirement? I agree it can't just be the majority of a quorum with such a small quorum, but absolute majority seems like it wouldn't be (particularly) open to abuse, and two-thirds might be confining in a nuclear war or other mass-casualties scenario. (Come to think of it, absolute majority might also be tricky under those circumstances, but that's a problem the Constitution has already, so we don't need to solve it.)
The length is an issue, but it's not like the US Constitution doesn't already have some pretty long amendments (and you can go look at state constitutions for even more); just consider the 12th, 14th, 20th and 25th amendments.
The supermajority requirement on moving the place of meeting is just there to prevent a thin majority from moving it to some inconvenient location. Getting there might not be too much of an issue with modern travel, but there are other concerns that could arise. If civil order breaks down enough, it's not unthinkable that some legislators could literally fear for their lives in some parts of the country. (Already Gabrielle Giffords and Steve Scalise both come to mind; Thomas D'Arcy McGee is an example from further back.)
A mass-casualties event is going to pose lots of challenges to democratic governance anyway, possibly to the point of the executive (whoever that ends up being) having to rule by decree (YMMV on whether this would be more than they already do) until elections can be organised. The requirement probably doesn't matter in that scenario; if, let's say, the Twin Cities are taken out in a nuclear strike but enough legislators survive to still form a two-thirds majority, and Minnesota has adopted this amendment, I suspect that there would be very little stink raised if they met at the edge of the fallout zone, voted unanimously to meet in Duluth going forward, and then went there posthaste. ("Your Honour, we got as close to the designated meeting place as possible without risking unsafe radiation exposure; 'the law was made for man, not man for the law'.") It's nice to be able to plan for black-swan events, but not at the expense of permitting untoward shenanigans under more normal circumstances. But maybe there's something I'm missing.
One thing that does possibly come to mind is that "then most recent election" should be "then most recent general election" to avoid someone trying to claim that special elections count (one more hoop to jump through with expulsion, reducing the size of the body, then have someone resign and hold a special election, this is getting complicated but as you say, dealing with BS means whacking it all down preemptively).
Big fan of the new article for updates like this model. On really-live items I’ll often naturally still have the comments thread up and refresh for a few days anyway so I’ll see longer edits but there’s not much that rivals the dopamine hit of a fresh De Civ email!